son's discourse. Therefore, Bergson's text still reminds us that a presumably scientific explanation of perceptions of images lacks a grasp of complexity.

Our perceptions are undoubtedly interlaced with memories, and inversely, a memory, as we shall show later, only becomes actual by borrowing the body of some perception into which it slips. These two acts, perception and recollection, always interpenetrate each other, are always exchanging something of their substance as by a process of endosmosis (Bergson. 1982: p. 69).²

Saying this, Bergson proceeds towards clearing the concepts of perception and memory through the criticism of psychology. He understood very well that the narrow scientific approach could not be sufficient for completing the task, which he envisioned as he tried to disassociate "pure" memory from "pure" perception. Maybe without being aware about it himself Bergson worked in philosophy, and therefore in humanities in general, towards a parallel result as the brothers Lumiere had ensued in the technology of film.

The proper office of psychologists would be to dissociate them [perception and recollection], to give back to each its natural purity; in this way many difficulties raised by psychology, and perhaps also by metaphysics, might be lessened. But they will have it that these mixed states, compounded, in unequal proportions, of pure perception and pure memory, are simple. And so we are condemned to an ignorance alike of pure memory and of pure perception; to knowing only a single kind of phenomenon which will be called now memory and now perception, according to the predominance in it of one or other of the two aspects; and, consequently, to finding between perception and memory only a difference in degree and not in kind. The first effect of this error, as we shall see in detail, is to vitiate profoundly the theory of memory, for if we make recollection merely a weakened perception we misunderstand the essential difference between the past and the present, we abandon all hope of understanding the phenomena of recognition, and, more generally, the mechanism of the unconscious (Ibid, 1982: pp. 69 -70).

This and other translations of Bergson's text are taken from the translation of *Matter and Memory* by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer from 1911. Of course, such classic texts are available on the web.