

almost no democracy at all as in the Soviet case. Therefore, it may seem that in the modern or post-modern democracy such ideologies are necessarily condemned to remain only ephemeral and more or less marginalised. This would hold true if the extremist ideologies could be just a reappearance of exactly the same ideologies with the same strategies as the original ones. There are strong reasons to believe that the extreme ideologies are able to adapt, to develop and get strengthened by any kind of crisis of democracy or even by provoking a crisis themselves through the support of economic, class and other vested interests. They can even become different ideologies; they may even mimic a democratic discourse and behaviour – as in many cases of the postmodern political hybridity. However, they cannot change their basic attitude as they are making use of a criticism of democracy, presumably “empty of content” and unable to deliver for the needs of deprived masses or disadvantaged *Volk*, or *popolo*, or *narod*, or whatever may be the case within different languages and cultures.⁴

Furet’s outstanding historical reflection written in the wake of the post-communist world, may be read as a strong reminder that any simplified view of the past or over-optimistic assertions of a rise of a discontinued new epoch may be fatally wrong. The inevitable reduction of complexities of the historical circumstances that occurs in a historical narration or, for example, in a condensed film or edited video, may suggest to the reader/viewer of today an utterly wrong impression of the nature of events in the not so distant past. At the time of the rise of bolshevism and fascism the world has already been “globalised”, and this fact was quite clearly mirrored in the both ideologies, since bolshevism planned the world revolution and Nazism announced that the superior race is about to rule the world. The communication technology of the time was less developed, yet radio, telegraph, telephone and film were already able to induce a global cognizance. The “information society” of today and near future, apart from

4 A good example how misread or misunderstood these interpretations may be was a prevailing perception of the events in former Yugoslavia by the reporters and their public in the West at the time of the last war in Yugoslavia. The horrible events that marked the first few years of the last decade and dominated the news in the global media for some four years were perceived because of “tribal hatred” with deep roots in centuries of rivalry in the Balkans. The same reporters and public would probably hesitate to accept an assertion that the Germany of the 1930s was “tribal” or “uncivilised”. Yet, quite a lot of parallels between the rise of Nazism and the nationalist regime in Serbia were quite obvious. Certainly, a number of French intellectuals (Bernard-Henry Levy, Alain Finkielkraut, etc.) indicated the contours of this perception, when they tried to analyse the reasons of the West’s inability to intervene properly in the Balkans.