

Widely repudiated and fiercely criticised Fukuyama's thesis on the "end of history" nevertheless represents a general point of reference concerning the problem. Although most of the criticism may be well founded, Fukuyama's idea of the end of history at least marks a point in (our) time, which has its symbolical beginning in the event of the fall of Berlin wall. ".../ if we are now at a point where we cannot imagine a world substantially different from our own, in which there is no apparent or obvious way in which the future will represent a fundamental improvement over our current order, then we must also take into consideration the possibility that History itself might be at an end" (Fukuyama, 1992: p. 51). Advocating optimism, Fukuyama asserts that no viable alternative to liberal democracy is possible, although he admits that ideologies of nationalism or religious fundamentalism may play some role in the view of his notion of *thymos* or desire for recognition. If there is any importance of Fukuyama's work, then it should be found exactly in his "grand scheme", his somewhat abstract and superficial approach to the problem of the post-modern global society. In a certain sense then a criticism of Fukuyama's work might be read as a further approximation of the problem.

Having neglected to re-elaborate a thinking of the event, Fukuyama oscillates confusedly between two irreconcilable discourses. Even though he believes in its effective realization..., Fukuyama does not hesitate all the same to oppose the *ideality* of this democratic *ideal* to all the evidence that bears massive witness to the fact that neither the United States nor the European Community has attained the perfection of the universal State of liberal democracy, nor have they even come close (Derrida, 1994: p. 63).

This controversy finally brings us to the problem, which we were seeking to articulate throughout this chapter. Since Fukuyama – although widely misread in this sense – did not establish any end of ideologies, even within his schemes of the prevailing of liberal democracy in the empty space of, yet again, exposed tension between the ideal and the chances of the ideal to become real in the context of the "real world", there is a social space open for ideology as a medium of the externalising of a particular subjectivity. We may add that Derrida's criticism in a way brings forward an argument originating from another kind of reading of Hegel, who is one of the crucial points of reference in Fukuyama's text. To put it simply: Derrida points out the importance of the process (Hegel's dialectic represented by his *Phenomenology*) against the result (the end of History), which is much more than Fukuyama imagines open to manifold liabilities of the further pro-