

*ativism, to the levelling of values, to the lowering of greatness, to the abolition of those differences, which make for the singularity of the “creator”, always located in the realm of the Unique? (Ibid: p. xvii).*

As much as these questions clearly aim at constituting a methodological basis for what follows in Bourdieu’s influential book as a complex analysis of the “literary field”, heavily building upon, above all, Gustave Flaubert’s work, they mark a very significant period in the modernist and contemporary discussions on a position of art in the social context; as if any other broad context existed! The very need to stress the “socialness” of the context is indicative for the position of art and its activity at the time of significant transformations of forms of art and a revolution of conditions, within which it is being produced. Changes of modes in which art is “consumed”, of course, make part and parcel of these varying contexts. At the time when Bourdieu had put a new emphases on these questions, he denoted what was already becoming a rather common knowledge in different fields of cultural analysis, shaped gradually through and by various combinations of the post-structuralist epistemology, critical discourse analysis, feminist and postcolonial theories, and so on. Correspondingly, one must not forget the influences of a multitude of modern and postmodern forms of artistic practice itself as well. To make my point even clearer, let me just expose another set of Bourdieu’s questions, which address what happens to be designated by the notion of *transcendence*:

*Why such implacable hostility to those who try to advance the understanding of the work of art and of aesthetic experience, if not because the very ambition to produce a scientific analysis of that individuum ineffabile and of the individuum ineffabile who produce it, constitutes a mortal threat to the pretension, so common (at least among art lovers) and yet so “distinguished”, of thinking of oneself as an ineffable individual, capable of ineffable experiences of that ineffable? (Ibid.: p. xvii).*

These questions could be read not as a destruction or reduction of transcendence, but rather as a defence of the notion – to an extent – in the original Immanuel Kant’s sense. Addressing the realm of transcendence as “ineffable” actually represents a renouncing of a potential of subjectivity, since the transcendental cannot reside anywhere without the agency in a figure of a subject. Since I do not intend to get caught in the discourse of Bourdieu on the level of its methodological opening, let me just point out